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[1] A spatiotemporal model is developed to examine prior appropriations–based water

curtailment in Idaho’s Snake River Plain Aquifer. Using a 100 year horizon, prior
appropriations–based curtailment supplemented with optimized water use reductions is
shown to produce a spatial distribution of water use reductions that differs from that
produced by regulatory curtailment based strictly on initial water right assignments.
Discounted proﬁts over 100 years of crop production are up to 7% higher when allocation is
optimized. Total pumping over 100 years is 0.3%, 3%, and 40% higher under 1, 10, and 100
year prior appropriations–based regulatory curtailment, respectively.
Citation: Elbakidze, L., X. Shen, G. Taylor, and S. Mooney (2012), Spatiotemporal analysis of prior appropriations water calls, Water
Resour. Res., 48, W00L07, doi:10.1029/2011WR010609.

1.

Introduction

[2] Groundwater levels in many aquifers have been
declining as a consequence of factors such as droughts, climate change, increased groundwater pumping, adoption of
more efﬁcient sprinkler irrigation technology that reduces
incidental recharge, and the expansion of irrigated agriculture [Cosgrove et al., 2008]. Declining water availability,
often coupled with increasing water demand, can increase
the number of costly water conﬂicts [Slaughter and Wiener,
2007; Baker and Willis, 2006; Jaeger, 2004; Boehlert and
Jaeger, 2010]. Rapid population growth (U.S. Census,
Population census: Resident population data, http://2010.
census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-pop-text.php,
accessed 10 February 2011) and projected climatic changes
[Bates et al., 2008] are likely to intensify water disputes.
[3] Prior appropriations (PA) doctrine relies on the tenet
of ‘‘ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in right’’ and operates under a continuum of relative priority of water rights held by water users
on the basis of seniority. During periods of water shortage,
PA doctrine allows relatively senior water rights holders to
place water calls to meet their water rights, if they believe
that their water rights are impaired by water use of junior
right holders. If a water call is granted, the administrative
authority issues a curtailment order that forces junior rights
holders to reduce their water use. It is important to emphasize that PA doctrine is the predominant system for establishing initial water endowments within the western United
States and provides a mechanism for water allocation during shortages. While PA does not itself preclude transfer of
water rights, substantial transaction costs and ambiguities
pertaining to the hydrologic externalities of such transfers
can preclude water right transfers from taking place [Young,
1986]. Supplementing PA doctrine with well-designed temporary reallocation policies that account for hydrologic
1
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho, USA.
2
Department of Economics, Boise State University, Boise, Idaho, USA.

Copyright 2012 by the American Geophysical Union
0043-1397/12/2011WR010609

externalities and reduce transaction costs could improve
economic efﬁciency, in the sense of potential Pareto
improvement, when a water call is placed. For example, if
appropriate temporary water reallocation policies are in
place, then junior water users subject to curtailment can
negotiate with senior water users and pay them to cut back
on their water use enough to satisfy the call made by senior
water users. This would be consistent with Coasian bargaining, which results in the optimal allocation of resources
through mutual bargaining, assuming no transaction costs,
irrespective of the initial allocation of property rights
[Coase, 1960]. Following the logic of Gisser [1983], the
objective in this paper is to examine the potential magnitude of welfare gains measured by the change in the discounted present value of combined regional proﬁts from
agricultural production if costless water reallocation policies are in place. Transaction costs associated with implementing such policies are not addressed in this paper.
Nevertheless, it is important to investigate the extent to
which water reallocation policies might produce potential
Pareto improvements even before transaction costs are explicitly considered.
[4] Prior appropriations–based administrative curtailment that is not supplemented with water right reallocation
as a component of overall response to water shortage may
produce economically efﬁcient outcomes in some cases but
not in others. The spatial distribution of water right seniority coincide with the spatial distribution of agricultural soil
productivity if the most productive land was developed ﬁrst
and was granted senior water rights. In such a situation,
curtailment according to seniority of water rights approximates the economically efﬁcient pattern of curtailment in
terms of soil productivity. However, land development is
often constrained as much by access to infrastructure as by
soil productivity. Therefore, relatively more productive
land can in some cases have relatively junior water rights.
For example, among surface water rights, lands nearest
watercourses often have senior priorities regardless of soil
productivity. In eastern Idaho, these gravelly alluvial
soils are often less productive than distant wind-deposited
soils. Among groundwater rights, lands nearest adequate
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electrical transmission lines can have senior priorities
regardless of soil productivity. Further, PA-based management, not supplemented with the opportunity for temporary
water reallocation, does not account for linkages between
the economic and hydrologic attributes of the water basin.
When water right seniority does not coincide with soil
productivity, and/or in cases where soil productivity and
hydrologic connectivity are not spatially homogeneous
such PA-based curtailment may produce suboptimal outcomes. Regional hydrologic and economic attributes play
signiﬁcant roles in the selection of site-speciﬁc conjunctive
management strategies that result in economically efﬁcient
allocation of scarce water resources across space and time
in the sense of potential Pareto optimality where ground
and surface water are hydraulically connected.
[5] In this paper we use the combined present value of regional proﬁts from agricultural crop production as the measure of economic efﬁciency. We provide a hydroeconomic
theoretical framework and a corresponding empirical model
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that couples economic and hydrologic considerations to
determine economically optimal, spatially explicit, groundwater management policies during water shortages. A
simulation-based empirical application of the framework
is presented for the Eastern Snake River Plain Aquifer
(ESRPA) in southern Idaho (Figure 1), currently experiencing signiﬁcant water rights disputes. The economic implications of water management decisions in this region are
tremendous, involving two million irrigated agricultural
acres, numerous hydropower facilities, municipalities, and
the largest producers of trout in the United States. Decreasing groundwater levels led to the formation of the Comprehensive Aquifer Management Plan [Idaho Department
of Water Resources (IDWR), 2009], which was passed
in 2009 to remedy aquifer depletion through conjunctive
management.
[6] A proﬁt maximization model for the region’s agricultural industry is integrated with spatiotemporal hydrologic
response functions for each geographically explicit zone of

Figure 1. Eastern Snake River Plain Aquifer (ESRPA) in Idaho and the dynamic response functions
that express the effects of 1 acre-foot reduction in consumptive use in three different zones (A, B, and C)
on discharge at Thousand Springs. Integration of a response function from t ¼ 0 to t ¼ t0 provides total
volume of additional relief at the target area (Thousand Springs) produced by reducing consumptive use
of groundwater in that zone by 1 AF.
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the Eastern Snake River Plain (ESRP). The empirical
model is used to compare the relative economic efﬁciency
of prior appropriations–based curtailment [Contor et al.,
2006] under the assumptions of with (PAR) and without
(PA) temporary water reallocation. Under the PAR scenario, water use implied by PA can be reallocated on the
basis of maximizing the combined regional discounted
proﬁts under the assumption of zero transaction costs. The
PAR mechanism is constrained to meet the call made by
senior water users and deliver an amount of water no less
than the amount delivered under PA to the target area (the
reach where senior water users issue a call demanding that
junior water users be managed in accordance with prior
appropriations doctrine). The framework has a number of
novel attributes, including (1) incorporation of spatial as
well as temporal considerations of the hydrologic system in
concert with economic decisions, (2) incorporation of soil
productivity as well as hydrologic connectivity in designing
a management strategy, (3) quantiﬁcation of potential beneﬁts of enhancing the PA-based water allocation with a policy that would facilitate optimized water use (the estimated
beneﬁts can be used as an upper bound of potential transaction costs for feasibility of implementing such policy), and
(4) illustration of empirical results using maps. This is useful for illustrating the consequences of alternative ways
of resolving water conﬂicts to individual stakeholders and
policy makers.

2.

Analytical Framework

[7] Prior research has shown the effects of distance, and
associated conveyance losses during water delivery, on
the spatial allocation of irrigation water [Chakravorty and
Roumasset, 1991]. We add to this work by examining the
problem of conjunctive administration of groundwater
given its effect on surface water rights, incorporating temporal and spatial dimensions. Similar to previous studies
[Vaux and Howitt, 1984; McCarl and Parandvash, 1988;
Michelson and Young, 1993; Ward and Lynch, 1997,
Tanaka et al., 2006; Booker et al., 2005] our project
focuses on water distribution between multiple irrigation
zones (an individual zone comprises all groundwaterirrigated lands within a single block of a regular rectangular
grid).
[8] Assuming a planning horizon T, producers maximize
total proﬁts from agricultural crop production with I irrigaI X
T
X
er Rzt ðwz Þ, where z are individual
tion zones as
z
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strained pumping volume bounded only by the individual
groundwater rights.
[9] Under the PAR scenario, the requirement that senior
appropriators issuing a water call in the target area receive
at least
" Bt amount of additional
# water can be expressed as
Z
t
X
X
ð
wz  wz; Þt ðdz Þ  Bt ; 8t, where ð
wz  wz; Þ
z

¼0

is a decrease in groundwater use (pumping) in irrigation
zone z in period , and Bt is the relief that would have been
afforded in period t by the prior appropriation–based curtailment. t denotes the period in which the relief at the
target area is realized, and  represents the period when
pumping was reduced in a given zone. t ðdz Þ is the
hydrologic response function showing the amount of
relief at the target area in period t after a 1 acre-foot
(ac ft, 1 ac ft ¼ 1234 m3) decrease in consumptive use
in zone
z in period , or t# –  periods ago. Therefore,
"
Z
t
X
X
ð
wz  wz; Þt ðdz Þ measures the cumulative
z

¼0

amount of relief at the target area in period t from reductions in pumping in all zones during preceding periods. The
response function is speciﬁed as a function of transient hydraulic distance (dz) from zone z to the target area (G. S.
Johnson et al., Snake River Basin surface water—ground
water interaction, 1998, available at http://www.if.uidaho.
edu/_johnson/iﬁwrri/sr3/home.html). The greater the hydraulic distance between the target area and an irrigation
zone, z, the smaller the proportion of decrease in consumptively used groundwater that propagates from irrigation
zone z to the target area. Taken in its entirety, the above
constraint requires the PAR scenario to supply groundwater
contributions to the target area (i.e., river gains or spring
ﬂow at the reach of interest) from all irrigation zones that is
no less than the relief Bt provided by regulatory curtailment, PA, in each time period. Under the PA solution to
the water call, Bt is generated by curtailing enough water
users who are junior to the users issuing the call, until the
requirements of the call are met.
[10] The Lagrangian for the social planner’s optimization under the PAR scenario is
max : L ¼
wz

Z X
T
X
z

er Rz ðwz Þ

¼0

(

þ

T
X
t¼0

"
#
) (1)
Z
t
X
X
t
ð
wz  wz; Þt ðdz Þ  Bt
z

¼0

t¼0

irrigation zones, r is the discount rate, and Rz ðwz Þ is proﬁt
in irrigation zone z in period  as a function of pumped
groundwater, wz . Faced with a water shortage senior surface water rights holders can exercise their right to make a
water call to receive Bt amount of relief (i.e., additional
water) in time period t at a speciﬁc location (henceforth
referred to as the target area), consistent with their rights.
Thus, Bt can be interpreted as the amount of relief that
would be produced by the administrative curtailment to
which the administrative agency determines that the senior
 z represent the maximum amount of
user is entitled. Let w
groundwater pumped in each irrigation zone under no
 z is the unconwater shortage. Another way to interpret w

The ﬁrst-order condition is as follows :
ert R0z ðwz Þ 

T
X

t t ðdz Þ ¼ 0

8z; 

(2)

t¼

Applying the implicit function theorem [Simon and Bloom,
1994], we get
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T
X

t 0t ðdz Þ
@wz
t¼
¼ r 0
@dz
e Rz ðwz Þ

8z; 

(3)
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[11] Expression
(3) is positive when Rz ðwz Þ < 0 and
00
0t ðdz Þ < 0. Rz ðwz Þ < 0 implies that the proﬁt function
is concave with respect to water used (pumped).
0t ðdz Þ < 0 implies that decreasing groundwater pumping
by 1 ac ft in irrigation zones distant from senior appropriators issuing the water call, contributes less water to the target area than a 1 ac ft reduction in pumping in an irrigation
zone close to the target area. Equation (3) states that it is
optimal to increase water use (pumping) as distance (dz)
increases between a given irrigation zone, z, and the target
area, all else remaining unchanged. Conversely, the most
effective way to fulﬁll the senior water right holders’ water
calls would be to decrease water use (pumping) at locations
closer to the target area. This is a consequence of the underlying spatial hydrologic relationships which mean that a
unit reduction in pumping by irrigators close to the target
area will supply more water (greater beneﬁt) to the target
area, than will a corresponding unit reduction in pumping
by an irrigator located at a greater distance from the target
area, all else remaining unchanged.
[12] The optimal spatial distribution of pumping reductions will be affected by the relative characteristics of the
individual response function as well as by relative soil productivity. Obviously a small reduction on low-productivity
lands near the target is more cost-effective than a large
reduction on distant high-productivity lands. The trade-off
between small reductions on nearby high-productivity land
and larger reductions on distant low-productivity lands is
less intuitively explicit. Hydrologic connectivity and soil
productivity determine the optimal spatial and temporal solution to senior water right holders’ water calls. The PAbased mechanism may inadvertently account for relative
soil productivity if water right seniority corresponds to soil
productivity (i.e., if the most productive soils were settled
ﬁrst). However, explicit consideration of economic productivity is forbidden at least in Idaho prior appropriation law.
Furthermore, hydrologic factors affecting the optimal solution are not considered in the PA-based mechanism. The
PAR scenario takes both of these factors into consideration.

3. Eastern Snake River Plain Aquifer,
Idaho: Background
[13] The highly transmissive ESRPA underlies 26,000 km2
of southeastern Idaho, a productive agricultural area
dependent on irrigation [Cosgrove and Johnson, 2005;
Cosgrove et al., 2008]. Irrigated agriculture accounts for
more than 90% of water use in the region. The area is also
home to trout farms, located in the Thousands Springs area
(Figure 1), which depend upon the cold and highly oxygenated waters that spring from the walls of the Snake River
Canyon to produce over 70% of U.S. trout supplies (U.S.
Trout Farmers Association, About farm raised trout, http://
www.ustfa.org/consumers/about.html, accessed 15 November 2010). Some aquaculture producers in this area hold
water rights that are senior, relative to some of the groundwater pumping rights. In Idaho, springs are legally classiﬁed as surface water.
[14] By about 1905, most of the surface water supply in
the Snake River Plain was fully allocated, except for the
aforementioned springs. Flood irrigation, which provided
signiﬁcant aquifer recharge, contributed to rising aquifer
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levels and discharge from natural springs. New water rights
from springs were developed in the 1920s through 1970s,
including along the Thousand Springs Reach of the Snake
River. By the 1960s, surface water rights were fully
allocated and groundwater use was developing rapidly
[Cosgrove et al., 2008]. Eventually, groundwater pumping
and the adoption of sprinkler irrigation technologies reduced
aquifer recharge, increased withdrawals, and reduced spring
discharges [Cosgrove et al., 2008]. As aquifer water levels
and associated spring discharges started to decline, competition for water resources between junior users (predominantly
groundwater) and senior users (predominantly surface water)
intensiﬁed, and sparked interest in the interactions between
ground and surface water resources.
[15] In 2005, consistent with the prior appropriations
doctrine, senior spring water users ﬁled water delivery calls
with the IDWR, claiming that extraction by groundwater
pumpers in the ESRPA was causing spring ﬂows to decline
in the Snake River Canyon at Thousand Springs [Wilkins,
2009]. In response to the water call from senior water users,
in March 2009, IDWR issued curtailment notices affecting
865 groundwater rights with priority dates later than 16
January 1972. This notice had the potential to affect irrigated production on 41,000 acres of agricultural land. This
curtailment was based on hydrologic calculations of water
use reductions by junior water users that would generate
enough spring ﬂow to fulﬁll obligations to senior water
right owners at the Thousand Springs Reach of the Snake
River. The curtailment order was contested and has not
been implemented.

4.

Empirical Model

[16] The ESRPA spans 18 counties and in this model is
divided into 1370 zones, measuring 5 square kilometers
each, including 795 zones that have agricultural production. Each zone is characterized with up to 6 soil types that
vary in their productivity (based on Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) Soil Data Mart classiﬁcations,
http://soildatamart.nrcs.usda.gov, accessed January 2010,
hereafter referred to as NRCS, 2010), up to 9 crops, two
irrigation technologies (gravity and sprinkler), and two
water sources (surface and ground). Each zone in our
model is represented by a hydrologic response function
obtained from the Eastern Snake River Plain Model
(ESRPM 1.1) [Cosgrove and Johnson, 2005; Cosgrove
et al., 2006]. Each response function shows the rate at
which additional groundwater becomes available over time
at the Thousand Springs reach as a result of a 1 ac ft reduction in consumptively used groundwater in a given zone.
Figure 1 shows example response functions for three different zones. The areas underneath the curves are the total volume of contributions to relief at the target area from a 1 ac ft
reduction of consumptive use of groundwater in a given
zone. For the most part, zones located further away from
the target area provide less relief because a greater proportion of reduced consumptive use is expressed at areas other
than the target area (similar to conveyance losses in the
work by Chakravorty and Roumasset [1991]). However,
notice that in Figure 1 the relief from zone B in the earlier
years is greater than relief from zone A even though zone
A is located closer to the target area. This spatial
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hydrologic heterogeneity does not necessarily coincide
with the logic that zones located further from the target
area will produce less relief at the target area than zones
located near the target area, as assumed in section 2. The
governing physical relationship is hydraulic distance relative to other connected reaches. Hydraulic distance is a
function of the aquifer storage coefﬁcient, aquifer transmissivity and geographic distance [Theis, 1941].
[17] The other factor affecting the optimal spatiotemporal
distribution of curtailment is the spatial distribution of soil
productivity. Soil classiﬁcations in the ESRP range from 2
(most productive) to 6 (least productive). Figure 2 shows
the spatial distribution of soil productivity in the region.
Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of consumptively
used groundwater corresponding to water rights junior to
1973 per zone. Combined, Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that
there is a limited coincidence between the amount of water
rights junior to 1973 and the amount of less productive soils
across zones.
4.1. Economic Component
[18] Several studies have addressed the economics of
conjunctive water management in numerous regions
including the Snake River Plain. Briand et al. [2008] use

Figure 2.
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positive mathematical programming [Howitt, 1995] to
study the effects of Snake River ﬂow augmentation on farm
proﬁtability. Their model allowed adjustment in land use
patterns but not water applications, arguing that because of
the lack of substitutes for water in agricultural production
farmers will adjust cropping patterns rather than change
irrigation application rates. In contrast, our model allows
for both crop portfolio and water application rates (deﬁcit
irrigation) to be determined endogenously.
[19] Consistent with the objective function in equation
(1), the discounted present value of proﬁts from agricultural
production across the region is given by
Obj ¼

X


er pc;z Yz;c;s;i;ws; ðwz;c;s;i;ws; Þxz;c;s;i;ws;

z;c;s;i;ws;

 Cz;c xz;c;s;i;ws;  CWz;i wz;c;s;i;ws; xz;c;s;i;ws; 

(4)

where r is the discount rate, pc,z is price of crop c produced
in zone z (prices received by producers in different zones
are allowed to vary to reﬂect transportation costs) ;
Yz,c,,s,i,ws, (wz,c,i,ws, ) is per acre yield of crop c, in zone z,
on soil type s, under irrigation technology i and water
source, ws (ground or surface), in time period , as a

Spatial distribution of soil classes in ESRPA.
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Figure 3.

Spatial distribution of the amount of water rights junior to 1973.

function of corresponding per acre applied water w; similarly x is planted acreage ; Cz,c is costs associated with 1
acre of crop c in zone z excluding irrigation related
expenses; CWz,i is per acre-foot cost of irrigation water in
zone z under irrigation technology i. The choice variables
are xz,c,s,i,ws, and wz,c,s,i,ws, .
[20] Per acre crop production functions (yields) are
speciﬁed according to Martin et al. [1989] as a function of
applied irrigation water w:
Yz;c;s;i;


 wmc;s;i
wz;c;s;i; ETmc ETdc;s
¼ Ymc;s  ðYmc;s  Ydc;s Þ 1 
wmc;s;i

c

xz;c;s;i;ws;  LANDz;s;i;ws 8z; s; ws; i; 

[23] Crop mix constraints (equations (7) and (8)) are
used to implicitly reﬂect crop rotation patterns and production resource constraints including capital, agronomic
restrictions, labor, etc., by county consistent with previous
literature [Adams et al., 2003; McCarl, 1982; Schneider
et al., 2007].
X

(6)

where LANDz,s,i,ws is the acreage of soil type s in zone z
that is under irrigation technology i and uses water from
water source ws.

xðz0 2cntÞ;c;s;i;ws; 

ðz0 2cntÞ;s;i;ws



(5)

[21] Where, Ym is crop yield at maximum irrigation, Yd
is nonirrigated yield (dry yield), wm is irrigation depth at
full irrigation, ETm is evapotranspiration at Ym, and ETd is
evapotranspiration at Yd.
[22] The constraint on availability of various classes of
land in each zone is
X
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X

cnt;;h cmixc;h;cnt

h

(7)

X

LANDðz0 2cntÞ;s;i;ws 8c; ; cnt

ðz0 2cntÞ;s;i;ws

X

cnt;;h ¼ 1

8; cnt

(8)

h

Constraints (7) and (8) rely on past h years of planted crop
mix acreages to reﬂect historically observed crop mix patterns in simulated planting decisions over time. Here
cmixc,h,cnt is the historical percentage of planted acreage in
year h devoted to crop c in a given county (cnt); cnt,,h is a
choice variable, between 0 and 1, which shows the percentage of acreage in a given county in simulated year  that is
planted consistent with crop acreage distribution observed
in year h. In other words, cnt,,h for a given county (cnt)
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and given simulation year () indicates the percentage of
total acreage that is planted in that year () in similar crop
acreage proportions to historical year h. Clearly, cnt, ,h, for
each county and simulation year have to be less than or
equal to 1, and summation of cnt, ,h over h in any year ()
and county (cnt) has to be less than or equal to 1 to eliminate the possibility of having more than 100% of acreage
allocated to various crops in a given year. Equation (7) constrains planted crop area, x, to be less than or equal to some
proportion of the historical crop mix and land availability.
Equation (8) determines the speciﬁc proportion. These constraints together restrict planted acreage of each crop over
the model’s multiyear timeframe to be no greater than the
maximum that has been observed historically and no less
than the minimum that has been observed historically.
Additionally, these constraints allow for ﬂexibility in planted
crop acreages for each crop as convex combinations of historically planted acreages. This representation allows for
some ﬂexibility in planted acreages within the bounds of
observed crop mixes in recent years. The convex combination of historical acreages guarantees that simulated planted
acreages will reﬂect crop rotation and other farm level
requirements that affect acreage decisions. Notice that
equations (7) and (8) are deﬁned over counties (cnt) rather
than irrigation zones solely because of data limitations. The
empirical model groups irrigation zones by county on the
basis of their geographic location. Irrigation zones that
straddle county borders are assigned to the county that contains the greatest proportion of the zone.
4.2. Incorporating Hydrology Into the
Economic Model
[24] Equations (4)–(8) compose the economic optimization model but do not reﬂect constraints on irrigation water
or hydrologic dependencies between irrigation zones and
the target area. A number of studies examine aquifer management using combined hydrologic-economic frameworks
[Chen et al., 2006; McCarl et al., 1999; Keplinger et al.,
1998; Schiable et al., 1999; Watkins and McKinney,
1999]. We use hydrologic response functions to quantify
the linkages between zones and the target area at Thousand
Springs. A similar approach utilizing a formulation based
on the response of aquifer head and streamﬂow to stresses
at various locations has previously been used [Ejaz and
Peralta, 1995]. Hydrologic dependencies have been quantiﬁed between different locations within the Snake River
Plain aquifer and reaches of the Snake River using groundwater ﬂow response functions [Cosgrove and Johnson,
2004, 2005]. Response functions can be useful criteria for
subdividing the aquifer into zones for conjunctive management of groundwater and surface water. The actual subdivision of the aquifer by irrigation zones, however, is based on
a desired balance between scientiﬁc precision and administrative convenience. The temporal distribution of depletion
of the Snake River Plain aquifer resulting from pumping
across geographically distributed pumping locations has
also been quantiﬁed [Cosgrove and Johnson, 2004, 2005].
The propagation of depletion may be distributed over periods ranging from days to decades depending on the proximity of the pumping location to the surface water body of
interest, and the hydraulic properties of the aquifer and
streams. The spatiotemporal response functions are obtained

W00L07

from Contor et al. [2006], who examined the effects of
prior appropriations–based curtailment on spatial distribution of pumping reductions on the basis of seniority of
water rights in the ESRPA.
4.3. Policy Scenarios
[25] This model (equations (4)–(10)) was run under three
scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, applied groundwater and
surface water are constrained to be less than or equal to
application levels observed in year 2006. This scenario is
included in the analysis to ascertain if the model reproduces
observed, ‘‘business as usual’’ crop production patterns. In
the second scenario (PA), groundwater user per zone is
constrained according to administrative curtailment which
shuts off irrigation water rights junior to 1973 (equation
(9)). The total amount of pumping in each zone is therefore
constrained to be less than or equal to the total amount of
~ ). The
water rights with priority dates earlier than 1973 (W
third scenario (PAR) is designed to produce the optimal
distribution of pumping reductions per zone subject to a
constraint that the pumping reductions under PAR deliver
relief at the target location no less than what would be
delivered under administrative curtailment over time (equation (10)). In any given year the quantity of water delivered
to the Thousand Springs area is measured as the summation
of relief generated from curtailment of pumping across all
the zones in previous years.
X

~ z;t
wz;c;s;i;ws;t  xz;c;s;i;ws;t  W

8z; t; ws ¼ ground water

c;s;i;ws

(9)
t X
X
¼0

z 
w

z

X

!
wz;  xz;c;s;i;ws;  iei t

c;s;i;ws

(10)

t X
X
~ z Þt 8t; ws ¼ ground water

ð
wz  W
¼0

z

 z is the amount of consumptively used water under
where w
~ z repreno water shortage and no curtailment per zone, W
sents water rights senior to 1973, iei is irrigation efﬁciency,
t is a hydrologic response function measuring the
amount of additional water that becomes available at the
target area in year t from reducing consumptive use of
groundwater by 1 ac ft in zone z in period .
[26] We intentionally restrict relief produced by PAR to
be no less than relief produced by PA even after administrative curtailment has been lifted. This differs from the current
rationale used by IDWR when evaluating alternative mitigation plans. IDWR requires alternative mitigation plans to
provide matching relief at the point of interest only for the
duration of administrative curtailment. We impose the
restriction in equation (10) for 100 years for the sake of exposition and consistency between the two mechanisms (PA
and PAR) regardless of the duration of administrative curtailment. Imposing constraint 10 only for the duration of
the administrative curtailment would ignore the relief that
is generated in the PA scenario in later years. Imposing
this constraint only during the period of Administrative
Curtailment would relax the restrictions on the PAR scenario resulting in fewer reductions in pumping and less
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economic cost under the PAR scenario, further reinforcing
our ﬁndings.

5.

Data

[27] Three categories of data are needed to empirically
solve the model. The ﬁrst category contains crop prices and
production costs by crop and zone, as well as irrigation
costs in various regions of ESRP (University of Idaho Extension Service, Costs and returns estimates (enterprise budgets), http://www.cals.uidaho.edu/aers/r_crops.htm, accessed
15 February 2011). Area speciﬁc data for nine crops (wheat,
corn grain, corn silage, barley, sugar beets, dry beans, alfalfa,
potatoes, and pasture) are used to parameterize equation (4).
We also use county-level crop mixes for the past 10 years
(USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service, data
and statistics, http://www.nass.usda.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Quick_Stats_1.0/index.asp, accessed 17 November 2010) in
equations (7) and (8).
[28] The second category of data includes crop, soil, and
climate characteristics needed to populate crop production
functions (equation (5)). Data are obtained from Soil Data
Mart (NRCS, 2010), the AgriMet weather database (U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, http://www.usbr.gov/pn/agrimet/,
accessed January 2010), University of Idaho Extension
publications [Allen and Robison, 2007], as well as personal
communications with extension agents. Data speciﬁcally
include growing season precipitation, maximum available
precipitation stored in root zone at planting, root zone
depth, seasonal ETm (full-irrigation evapotranspiration),
maximum yields of fully irrigated crops, and irrigation efﬁciency. Dry (nonirrigated) yield was calculated as a function of ETm, ETd (evapotranspiration under dryland
conditions), and Ym (crop yield under full irrigation)
[Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979; Allen et al., 1998; Martin
et al., 1989]. ETd was calculated as a function of precipitation stored in root zone at planting and growing season precipitation [Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979; Ponce, 1989].
Irrigation depths required for maximum yields were calculated as functions of ETm and the consumptive use fraction
of applied irrigation water (one of many deﬁnitions of irrigation efﬁciency) [Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979; Martin
et al., 1989]. Equation (6) uses spatially referenced data on
soil type acreage, obtained from Soil Data Mart (NRCS,
2010), and spatially referenced data on irrigation technology and water source, obtained from ESPAM 1.1 [Cosgrove et al., 2006].
[29] The third category of data includes hydrologic
response functions (equation (10)) as well as the status quo
amount of groundwater pumped (equation (9)). These data
are obtained from ESPAM 1.1 [Cosgrove et al., 2006] as
well as the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer Model Version 2
(ESPAM2). On the basis of the data in ESPAM 1.1, each
zone is assigned a hydrologic response function (relative to
the Thousands Springs area); consumptive use of ground
and surface irrigation water (based on consumptive use in
2006); water right distribution pre- and post-1973; and the
proportion of land irrigated with surface and groundwater
sources. Hydrologic response functions for each zone predict the impact of a 1 ac ft groundwater stress per zone on
surface water discharge in Thousand Springs over time
[Cosgrove and Johnson, 2004].

6.
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Results

[30] The model is ﬁrst used to simulate a representative
production pattern without imposing curtailment restrictions on water use. Water used in each zone is constrained,
however, to be no greater than observed use during years
with no water calls or curtailment orders. This simulation is
intended to provide insight on the accuracy of the model’s
output. In this simulation water use in each zone is constrained to 2006 levels of consumptive use (obtained from
ESPAM 1.1) and simulated crop planted acreage is a convex combination of historical crop mix from 1999 to 2008.
The simulated acreage numbers fall between the minimum
and the maximum proportions observed over the last 10
years of crop production and provide a reasonable representation of the business as usual scenario. For example, historically between 34% and 42% of planted acreage in
Bannock County has been allocated to wheat annually. The
model simulates 39% of acreage to be devoted to wheat in
Bannock County. Similar results hold for the rest of the
crops in the rest of the counties.
[31] The model is used to analyze three scenarios with
1 year, 10 year, and 100 year administrative PA-based curtailment speciﬁcations. Different curtailment periods are
analyzed because it is difﬁcult to predict how long water
users will be curtailed in any given instance. Under the
1 year curtailment speciﬁcation, administrative curtailment
of water rights junior to 1973 is enforced for only 1 year,
after which water use is allowed to revert to the business as
usual. Under the 10 year curtailment period, administrative
curtailment of water rights junior to 1973 is enforced for
10 years. Similarly, the 100 year curtailment scenario corresponds to administrative curtailment of water rights junior to 1973 imposed for 100 years. For each of these three
curtailment scenarios the spatial distribution and quantity
of pumping is compared between two alternative water
management scenarios, PA and PAR. In all three scenarios,
PAR is constrained to generate relief at Thousand Springs
that is no less than that generated by PA at any point in
time, including all future periods beyond the cessation of
PA administration. Discount rate of 5% is used for the
analysis.
[32] The difference in total pumping in each irrigation
zone, Wz;t , between prior appropriations doctrine based
curtailment with no water reallocation (PA) and curtailment supplemented with optimized water reallocation
(PAR) is used to demonstrate the differences in the spatial
distribution of pumping over time under the two water
management strategies.
PAR
PA
Wz;t ¼ Wz;t
 Wz;t

(11)

PAR
where, Wz;t
is the amount of water pumped in zone z in
year t under curtailment supplemented with optimized
PA
water reallocation, and Wz;t
is the amount of water pumped
in zone z and year t under strictly prior appropriations–
based administrative curtailment with no water reallocation. Obtained values of Wz;t are used to generate Figures
4, 5, and 6. Green shades represent negative values of
Wz;t for zones where pumping under a PA is greater than
pumping under PAR. Orange shades represent positive values of Wz;t , indicating that pumping under the PA scenario is less than under the PAR scenario.
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Figure 4. Pumping difference (volume pumped under the PAR scenario minus volume pumped under
the prior appropriations (PA) scenario) under 1 year of curtailment, with r ¼ 0.05. Green shading indicates areas in which pumping decreased under the PAR scenario compared to pumping under PA scenario. Red shading indicates areas in which pumping increased under the PAR scenario.
[33] Figure 4 shows differences in pumping volumes
between the two scenarios in years 1, 50, and 100 assuming
administrative curtailment is enforced only for 1 year (speciﬁcally the ﬁrst year of the model). The difference in
pumping is greatest in the ﬁrst year. Since administrative
curtailment is only enforced in the ﬁrst year, pumping levels in the following years revert to the business as usual
scenario. Under the PAR scenario, however, pumping continues to be lower in a small number of zones, compared to
pumping under administrative curtailment. The reason for
this pattern is that equation (10) imposes a requirement that
even in years when administrative curtailment is no longer
implemented, spring ﬂow in the Thousand Springs area
under PAR scenario has to be no less than what would
occur under PA scenario. Since PAR achieves optimality
by generally moving reductions nearest the target, its relief
expires more rapidly than PA relief. Under the constraint
adopted here, future reductions must be maintained to sustain the long-delayed relief that would have resulted from
distant curtailment under PA.
[34] Pumping differences in years 1, 10, and 100 under
10 years of administrative curtailment are reported in
Figure 5. Similar to Figure 4, during the years when administrative curtailment is implemented, there is a change in
the spatial distribution and relative pumping levels as a consequence of changing from strict administrative curtailment

to one supplemented with optimized water reallocation.
When administrative curtailment is no longer being implemented zones revert to a pumping level corresponding to
the business as usual outcome. In Figure 6, administrative
curtailment is enforced for 100 years. Therefore, in all
years there are signiﬁcant differences between pumping
under PAR scenario relative to PA scenario.
[35] In general, the zones which decrease pumping under
a PAR scenario relative to a PA scenario tend to be located
closer to Thousand Springs. On the other hand, zones
which increase pumping under PAR scenario relative to PA
scenario tend to be located further away from the Thousand
Springs area. This outcome is driven by the fact that, absent
any transaction costs, it is generally more efﬁcient for
zones further from Thousand Springs to negotiate with
users closer to Thousand Springs and pay them to reduce
their pumping because the latter users’ reduction in pumping is generally more effective in terms of generating additional relief at the Thousand Springs target area. Distant
zones generally generate a higher fraction of relief to nontarget river and spring reaches.
[36] The appearance of isolated green islands within orange/red regions is caused by the parcel-to-parcel optimization on the basis of crop mix and soil types. Crop mix
convexity constraints do not allow the model to reduce
acreages of crops below what has been observed during the
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Figure 5. Pumping difference (volume pumped under the PAR scenario minus volume pumped under
the PA scenario) under 10 year curtailment, with r ¼ 0.05.

past 10 years. Therefore, what could not be achieved via
reduction of acreages close to Thousand Springs, because
of acreage constraints, has to be generated by foregone
pumping in more distant zones. Furthermore, zones with
less productive soils, or soils suitable only for lower-valued
crops, could rationally be considered for an increase in
foregone pumping even though distant from the springs.
[37] Figures 4–6 also reﬂect local hydrology near the
Snake River. The concentration of green zones in the southwest appears in Figures 4–6. This of course represents irrigated lands nearest Thousand Springs for which the delivery
call was made. However there is a concentration of darker
orange zones not too distant from this area, to the north and
to the west. The local hydrology explaining this phenomenon is that those zones are near a very productive spring
complex known as the Malad Gorge. Most of the relief
from forgone pumping in these zones would be expressed
at the Malad Gorge springs and not at the Thousand
Springs target area where senior users made the call for
water. The optimization model estimates that the costs of
curtailment to water users in this area exceed the costs of
curtailment in other areas that would generate equivalent
beneﬁts at Thousand Springs. Therefore, the model chooses
to limit pumping in other zones that have a greater impact

(provide greater beneﬁt) on the target area per acre-foot of
reduced consumptive use.
[38] Table 1 shows the effects on total pumping from the
aquifer over the next 100 years. For a 1 year curtailment,
the PAR scenario produces a 0.3% increase in the total
amount of pumped water over the next 100 years relative to
a PA scenario. Similarly, pumping increases by 3% and
40% for 10 year and 100 year administrative curtailment
scenarios, respectively, if optimized water reallocation is
allowed. Optimization allows the water call at Thousand
Springs to be met with a smaller reduction of pumping
under PAR than under PA. As a result, discounted returns
to groundwater irrigation are higher under PAR than under
PA.
[39] Table 1 also shows ratios of total discounted returns
to variable costs of production over the 100 years under PA
versus PAR for each curtailment length scenario. At a 5%
discount rate, for a 1 year administrative curtailment, optimized reallocation of water use can increase discounted
returns over 100 years by 0.3%, not accounting for any
potential transaction costs associated with reallocation process. For a 10 year curtailment scenario, discounted returns
increase by 2.5%. Similarly, for a 100 year curtailment scenario, discounted returns increase by close to 7%. A 40%
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Figure 6. Pumping difference (volume pumped under the PAR scenario minus volume pumped under
the PA scenario) under 100 year curtailment, with r ¼ 0.05.
increase in pumping produces only 7% increase in discounted net present value of proﬁts over a hundred year period in part because of the decreasing marginal physical
product of irrigation water as reﬂected in production functions used in this model [Martin et al., 1989]. This also
results in part because only the ﬁnancial returns (but not
pumping reductions) are discounted, and in part because
the crop mix constraint that sustains production of lowvalue crops necessarily limits production of high-value
crops.
Table 1. Comparison of Discounted Returns to Variable Costs of
Agricultural Production (Over a 100 year Timeframe) and Total
Water Pumped Under PAR and PA Scenariosa

r ¼ 0.05
1 year
10 years
100 years
r ¼ 0.07
1 year
10 years
100 years
a

Ratio of Discounted
Returns Under PAR
Versus PA Scenarios
(%)

Ratio of Total Amount of
Extracted Water Under
PAR Versus PA Scenarios
(%)

100.31
102.56
106.85

100.30
102.98
140.36

100.42
103.27
106.86

100.26
102.99
140.27

PAR, prior appropriations with reallocations of water use; PA, prior
appropriations.

7.

Conclusions

[40] The prior appropriations doctrine provides a framework which can be used to address conﬂicts over water
resources during water shortages. In times of water shortages senior water right holders can place a ‘‘call’’ to obtain
water to which they are entitled. With the advent of conjunctive administration of groundwater and surface water
rights in Idaho, this holds even in situations where the users
placing a call have senior surface water rights for spring
discharge which is affected by groundwater pumping of
junior irrigators, either nearby or distant. The economic efﬁciency curtailment of junior pumpers can be potentially
enhanced by reallocating water rights between pumpers
whose wells are hydraulically connected with the affected
spring discharge.
[41] Distribution of water right seniority may, in some
cases, coincide with the distribution of soil productivity if
most productive soils were settled ﬁrst and hold more senior water rights. In that case, curtailment without water
reallocation inadvertently may achieve some efﬁciency
by curtailing least productive producers ﬁrst. However,
PA-based curtailment does not necessarily and cannot
explicitly consider productivity and does not account for
hydrologic connectivity between curtailed water users and
the target area. Supplementing PA-based administrative
curtailment with appropriate policies for water right
reallocation could incorporate both soil productivity and
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hydrologic connectivity, in determining optimal spatiotemporal distribution of curtailment necessary to meet a senior
water users’ call.
[42] Generally, an increase in the distance between a
regulated well and the spring where relief is needed
decreases the proportion of conserved groundwater that
actually reaches the target area. In addition to having a
greater portion of beneﬁt propagated to nontarget locations,
administrative curtailments that take place further away
from the target area require a longer period of time to generate relief at the target area. If the objective is strictly to
deliver to senior water users the amount of additional relief
to which they are entitled to under PA doctrine, then, in
general, the most efﬁcient means to achieve this objective
is to curtail groundwater use hydraulically nearest to the
target area.
[43] The empirical results in our model show a different
spatiotemporal distribution of reduced pumping under prior
appropriations–based curtailment (PA) with no water reallocation versus prior appropriations–based curtailment supplemented with potential water reallocation (PAR), to
achieve equivalent relief at the target area. Results also
show the overall amount of pumped water from the aquifer
over the hundred year horizon to be greater under PAR scenario than under strictly PA scenario. Under PAR, pumping
reductions take place closer to the Thousand Springs area,
providing greater relief at the Thousand Springs area per
acre-foot of reduced pumping. Therefore, it is not surprising that under PAR, pumping reduction that produces the
required relief at Thousand Springs, is less than under PA.
While the distribution of pumping reductions in the PAR
scenario are more economically efﬁcient for fulﬁlling senior water users’ water call in terms of overall proﬁt maximization, they may not be effective at stabilizing aquifer
water levels in the long run. The question of aquifer level
stabilization deserves a separate investigation and requires
different hydrologic speciﬁcations; aquifer stabilization is
a different goal from providing relief to a speciﬁc senior
water user. Further, it is not clear whether administrative
curtailment may legally be invoked in Idaho to pursue the
goal of aquifer stabilization. Different goals of course
imply different objective functions and therefore we would
expect to see different outcomes. We leave this exercise for
future analysis and instead focus on identifying the economically efﬁcient means of fulﬁlling senior water users’
water call during a water shortage.
[44] Conjunctive administration of surface and groundwater resources is complicated because individual groundwater user’s activities impact potentially all other surface
and groundwater users in the basin to various degrees.
Understanding the cause and effect relationships between
groundwater pumping (or recharge) and depletion (or
accretion) of rivers, springs, and lakes in various locations
is essential for making effective and comprehensive water
management decisions. In our model we have constrained
PAR to never increase pumping in any zone beyond the
amount equal to currently existing water rights ; hence,
PAR like PA will always be superior to the status quo for
all nontarget reaches. Nevertheless quantifying and incorporating beneﬁts to the nontarget reaches would change the
objective function and therefore the results. Also, in contexts where several spatially distant senior water users
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might be issuing water calls, analyses similar to the one
presented in this study would require a constraint similar to
equation (10) for each reach in which senior appropriators
have placed a water call. Multidimensional response functions, similar to the ones used in this study, will have to be
utilized to reﬂect how pumping in each zone affects water
users along numerous reaches.
[45] A limitation of the model used in this study is that
aquifer levels may change over time, and as a result,
response functions theoretically might change as well.
However, the response functions used here assume that aquifer conditions over the next 100 years will remain constant
enough to satisfy the principle of hydrologic superposition
[Reilly et al., 1987]. Hydrologic investigation indicates that
this is true; response functions are expected to be robust to
the magnitude of changes likely during the simulation period [Cosgrove and Johnson, 2004]. Moreover, aquifer levels over the next 100 years are also likely to be inﬂuenced by
other water uses in addition to agriculture. The hydrologic
imprecision arising from the assumption of constant response
functions is small relative to economic and policy imprecision arising from uncertainty about future commodity prices,
crop production practices, and water right administration.
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